by Meriam Holmstrom

Serbia’s existence in the Balkans does not have a longstanding history of peace, and to this day, Serbia’s relations with, for instance, neighbouring Kosovo are far from serene. Hence, its decision to rebuild its military capacity after its degeneration post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and early 2000s should perhaps be cause for concern. On the other hand, strong military power can be argued to have symbolic meaning. A country with a modern military is less susceptible to foreign occupation. Building military capacity can also be seen as a political tactic, as it could be used to appeal to voters, showing how the political leader is working to create a more influential and credible nation on the international playing field. Both these views should be assessed to conclude whether Serbia is simply being prudent by building a military capacity it can use for self-defence, or whether it is acting impetuously by giving its neighbours reason to fear possible use of force on Serbia’s part.

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Serbia building up its military capacity can be inferred to be nothing but anticipating unrest and thus preparing for a possible need for self-defence. The prospect of turbulence is something likely to be on Serbian minds having been a Soviet satellite state in the past, in addition to being in close vicinity to Russia’s current endeavours in Ukraine. These events prove that it is not completely out of the realm of possibility that Serbia could be under threat, therefore it is reasonable to invest in a strong military that repels hostilities and can take action if any such arise. 

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Building the Serbian military could also be just for show. Though this links to the point of being a repellant for hostile states, as a large army can boast its powers without actually engaging in active hostilities, the building of military capacity could also be a mere political tactic. The political rhetoric of building a more powerful and influential nation often appeals to voters. The two foregoing explanations for building military capacity are plausible especially seeing as Serbia is surrounded by NATO Member States and is unlikely to want to repeat the damage done in the late 1990s and the early 2000s during the Yugoslav wars. 

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Yet, the aforementioned cannot fully explain Serbia’s hostile behaviour. Especially considering the uneasy relations between the two states, the threat of force being used against neighbouring Kosovo can be inferred from Serbia flying warplanes and deploying armoured vehicles close to the border of Kosovo in response to a minor dispute. The seriousness of such an act is apparent considering that the threat of using force against another nation falls under the prohibition set out in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, making Serbia’s act arguably unlawful. This is because Kosovo is recognised as an independent nation by most of the European Union Member States and around half of the Member States of the United Nations, even though it does not have the status of a nation in international law as the International Court of Justice argued recognition to be a political matter [1]. The exception of self-defence as laid out in International Law Commission article 21 cannot in any manner be argued to apply here, as Serbia’s response was wholly unreasonable and disproportionate to a dispute about car number-plates, where Kosovo deployed special police to its border to stop Serb-plate cars as a response to Serbia's treatment of Kosovar-plate vehicles [2]. Therefore, the only possible conclusion is that judging by Serbia’s malevolent behaviour towards Kosovo, its motive for strengthening its military capacity is unlikely to be entirely oriented towards self-preservation.

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The self-defence argument seems even less likely considering the significantly smaller military budget of Serbia’s neighbours. With its current budget, Serbia outspends Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia combined [3]. Therefore, especially considering the campaign run by Serbia’s government-controlled tabloids which are increasingly pushing for the notion of an imminent war against Kosovo Albanians or the Croats, it can be argued that Serbia’s sudden military aspirations strive to build an army that could be used for powerful offence. 

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Another indication of a hostile motive for building up military capacity is the nationalist rhetoric by, for example, Serbia’s minister of the interior who refers to a “Serbian world” [4]. This suggests a desire to increase Serbian influence across the world, something that a strong army in and of itself is unlikely to do. This rhetoric is likely to be followed by action showing military prowess, many neighbouring countries fearing that they would be the likely targets of such a demonstration. The popularity of increased Serbian influence is reflected in Serbian politics with the ruling party being the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), a right-wing, populist party often promoting a nationalist sentiment. Worryingly, SNS has its roots in the far-right Serbian Radical Party (SRS) which is currently led by Vojislav Šešelj, who has been previously convicted of war crimes[5]. Therefore, fears of further antagonistic behaviour are reasonable.

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Though self-defence may be a reason for increased spending on the Serbian military, it is highly unlikely that it is the only reason given Serbia’s hostile conduct towards neighbouring countries and its disproportionately large military budget compared to other states in the region. There is unquestionably a reason for alarm considering Serbia’s conduct, paired with the nationalist rhetoric of not only one of its ministers but also the rise of far-right nationalist parties in recent years. Nevertheless, Serbia should tread lightly as a repetition of the Yugoslav wars would be devastating to the people of the region.