Rafal Gonta




 

Introduction

In September 2023, a Franco-German working group, set up by the governments of the two countries, published a report on European Union (EU) institutional reform, titled ‘Sailing on High Seas – Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century’.[1] In the report, the working group proposed changes to the decision-making process of the Council of the EU in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’). The changes include, inter alia, the introduction of qualified majority voting (‘QMV’) in decisions on defence initiatives, which means getting rid of Article 31(4) of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’). In return, the working group proposes a ‘sovereignty safety net’ extending the ‘reasons of national policy’ derogation of Article 31(2) TEU. Since the proposals require changes to EU Treaties, they are unlikely to be seriously debated before the next institutional cycle (2024-2029).[2]

 

The working group’s proposals relating to QMV in decisions on defence initiatives are unsatisfactory. This is because, if implemented: (a) they will not enhance the EU’s capabilities in foreign policy due to the ‘sovereignty safety net’, and (b) they will alienate Eastern European Member States.

 

The ‘Sovereignty Safety Net’

Article 31(2) TEU provides a derogation allowing a Member State to declare opposition to a decision taken by QMV due to ‘vital and stated reasons of national policy’. After the declaration of opposition, ‘the Council [of the EU] may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity’.[3]

 

The ‘sovereignty safety net’ proposal will extend the use of the ‘reasons of national policy’ derogation to additional areas, e.g. defence (i.e. adapt the derogation to the wider use of QMV). This means maintaining the requirement of unanimity in the European Council. Thus, any Member State, if determined enough, will still be able to block a decision. In areas where Member States have diverging geopolitical interests, such as defence, transfer of voting to the European Council will most likely be a common scenario.

 

Proponents of extending QMV to decisions on defence initiatives (e.g. the use of the European Defence Fund) emphasise the EU’s inability to react to geopolitical challenges under the current decision-making process. However, the ‘sovereignty safety net’ proposal will not diminish the ‘weight’ of a single Member State’s veto. Unless there is consensus among Member States, the length of the decision-making will remain the same. Hence, the so-often discussed inefficient response by the EU to the 2020 election in Belarus – where the EU was far behind the UK in imposing sanctions due to Cyprus’s resistance – would have been the same with the ‘sovereignty safety net’ implemented. Therefore, as long as the ‘sovereignty safety net’ includes unanimity, the proposal will not speed up the EU’s decision-making and thus, fail to enhance its capabilities in foreign policy.

 

Alienating Eastern European Member States

To make QMV more ‘acceptable’, the Franco-German working group proposes a rebalancing of voting shares – for example requiring 60% (instead of 55%) of Member States representing 60% (instead of 65%) of the EU population. Still, wider use of QMV will very likely strengthen the position of France and Germany vis-à-vis smaller Member States. This is due to the two countries’ economic power and their ability to form coalitions within the EU (e.g. a ‘Group of Friends on QMV in CFSP’ comprising 12 Member States[4]). However, the factual strengthening of France and Germany is far less important than the ‘symbolic value’ of QMV in decisions on defence. This is because many Eastern European Member States consider the proposals as threatening their sovereignty.

 

Polish and Hungarian MEPs strongly oppose, often beyond national political divides, proposals for the amendment of EU Treaties (e.g. the 2022/2051(INL) Report of the European Parliament). The governments of countries like Bulgaria or Croatia, in turn, have been vocal about upholding the unanimity rule, especially in CFSP.[5] This attitude’s ideological framework is best described by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – protecting ‘the sovereign rights of each Member State’.[6] Thus, any expansion of QMV onto CFSP, which means diminishing the ‘weight’ of a veto, will automatically be treated as undermining ‘the sovereign rights’. And due to the strictness of the ideological framework of ‘the sovereign rights’, no derogation, such as the ‘sovereignty safety net’, will make QMV in CFSP more acceptable. Therefore, the working group’s proposals will very likely alienate Eastern European Member States from Brussels. Consequently, many Eastern Europeans may lose faith in EU institutions.

 

Conclusion

The debate on the proposals of extending QMV onto CFSP mirrors the EU’s eternal dialectic – between federalisation and sovereignty of Member States. It is evident that federalisation means consolidation of the power of France and Germany. It is also evident that federalisation is the only way of surpassing the status quo. However, what the Franco-German working group tries to do is to reconcile the irreconcilable; it tries to move towards federalisation, whilst safeguarding the sovereignty of Member States. And the risks it runs outweigh the potential benefits.

 

[1] Olivier Costa and others, Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century (18 September 2023) <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2617322/4d0e0010ffcd8c0079e21329bbbb3332/230919-rfaa-deu-fra-bericht-data.pdf> accessed 22 November 2023.

[2] ibid

[3] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, art 31(2).

[4] Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain (later joined by Romania, Sweden and Denmark).

[5] ‘Less is more in foreign policy: unanimity hanging by a thread?’ (European Newsroom, 26 May 2023) <https://europeannewsroom.com/less-is-more-in-foreign-policy-unanimity-hanging-by-a-thread/> accessed 22 November 2023.

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, MFA statement in relation to the decision-making rules for matters related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU (7 May 2023) <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/mfa-statement-in-relation-to-the-decision-making-rules-for-matters-related-to-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp-and-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-of-the-eu> accessed 22 November 2023.